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## **FUTURE WAR PAPER**

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The National Campaign Planning Staff*

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## ABSTRACT

**Title:** Planning for Future War: The National Campaign Planning Staff

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**Thesis:** The USG should centralize its campaign planning within the National Security Council (NSC) creating a single planning staff consisting of members from all elements of the Executive Branch in order to develop comprehensive capabilities-based plans to reflect national and theater strategies.

**Discussion:** If the United States is to be successful in the conflicts of the future, it requires more than merely improved coordination among the various departments and agencies of the Executive Branch; it requires a fundamental change to the planning and execution of contingency operations. Although the existing campaign planning process does make attempts at interagency coordination during deliberate planning, it produces plans that have inadequate detail in what non-military capabilities are available to support operations and the employment of these capabilities to achieve campaign goals. Initiatives such as the Joint Interagency Coordination Group and the Department of State's Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization have helped to improve coordination, but they fall well short of what is needed for true reform.

The assignment of the planning process to the NSC vice the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will change the focus of campaign planning from purely military operations to a more holistic approach that leverages all of the elements of national power. The new planning organization within the NSC, known as the National Campaign Planning Staff (NCPS), will include members from all of the Cabinet-level departments and will conduct detailed planning in order to create campaign plans that reflect the national policy objectives and priorities of all the elements of the Executive Branch. The NCPS structure will mirror the existing regional combatant command structure and will report to the Deputy National Security Advisor for Planning, a new position created to direct all national campaign planning.

Once established, the NCPS's regional groups will develop capabilities-based plans that will replace the existing deliberate plans (operations plans, concept plans, and functional plans) maintained by the combatant commanders and serve as the foundation for crisis action planning. This reassignment of responsibility for the development of campaign plans does not mean that combatant commanders will cease all planning efforts. Combatant commanders, by virtue of their location and their insight into the complex cultural and political dynamics of a region, will continue to be an integral part of the process through their representatives at the NCPS and through daily operations in their respective areas of responsibility.

**Recommendation:** The President and Congress should initiate the required executive and legislative action to create a National Campaign Planning Staff within the National Security Council for the development and maintenance of campaign plans that reflect national and theater strategies that more fully incorporate all of the departments and agencies of the Executive Branch. This reform will require several departments within the Executive Branch to give up some statutory authority and funding, but will result in a more efficient planning process yielding campaign plans that accurately reflect the national interest.

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## **Campaign Planning in 2006**

If the United States is to be successful in the conflicts of the future, it requires significant improvement in coordination among the various departments and agencies of the Executive Branch. Contingency operations require active collaboration among all of the departments and agencies of the U.S. Government (USG) and the existing planning process used by the Department of Defense (DoD) has consistently failed to incorporate other parts of the USG when developing campaign plans. Recent USG initiatives for reform have fallen well short of the needed policy synchronization within the Executive Branch and enduring change will only come from a reassignment of the responsibility for campaign planning to an organization able to synchronize all of the various departments of the Executive Branch. The USG should centralize its campaign planning within the National Security Council creating a single planning staff consisting of members from all elements of the USG in order to develop comprehensive capabilities-based plans to reflect national and theater strategies.

As defined by the DoD, campaign planning is “the process whereby combatant commanders and subordinate joint force commanders translate national or theater strategic and operational concepts through the development of campaign plans.”<sup>i</sup> These campaign plans are the foundation for military operations undertaken by the DoD, encompassing both deliberate plans developed before the onset of a contingency and plans developed during crisis action. Based on guidance from the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), combatant commanders develop deliberate plans to address contingencies within their area of responsibility (AOR) to include operations plans, concept plans, and functional plans.<sup>ii</sup> While these campaign plans are military in nature, both DoD policy and doctrine state that the combatant commanders should incorporate the other

instruments of national power (diplomatic, informational, and economic) into operational plans.<sup>iii</sup>

Once a situation develops that requires action by the United States, the Joint Staff may select a deliberate plan to direct operations or may choose to modify an existing plan through crisis action planning to frame a suitable solution. A combatant commander or subordinate joint task force commander will then execute the operation as directed by the Joint Staff and approved by the President and SECDEF.

This deliberate planning process has produced campaign plans that synchronize the operations of the DoD and has made the United States military a force without equal in conventional warfare. However, the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) has reinforced that military capability alone will not ensure decisive victory against an enemy who chooses to fight using unconventional tactics rather than fielding a conventional force. President Bush's National Security Strategy correctly asserts that the United States will need all of the capabilities within the USG to defeat our enemies, not just those of the military.<sup>iv</sup> While the existing planning process does make attempts at coordination during deliberate planning with the other departments and agencies within the USG, the majority of plans produced have inadequate detail in what non-military capabilities are available to support operations and how these capabilities are to be used to achieve the campaign goals. Because of limited resources and the lack of a clear mandate from the President or Congress, the other agencies within the USG have played a very limited role in campaign planning, which has subsequently allowed the DoD dominate the planning and conduct of contingency operations. This lack of participation in planning coupled with the absence of a requirement for the combatant commander to coordinate with the other departments of the USG has the potential to produce plans that do not address all of the policy requirements of the Executive Branch or that can directly conflict with the overall strategic

vision of the USG. While most officials within the USG agree that interagency coordination needs to be improved, increasingly limited resources and the threat to the bureaucratic status quo that change would bring have prevented implementation of any significant reform. Commitment to reform must start with direction from the President if the needed reforms to the contingency planning process are to be successful.

### **Interagency Coordination during Contingency Operations**

Whether it was a civilian teacher providing English instruction to Filipinos during the Philippine Insurrection or a U.S. Agency for International Development officer working in Vietnam as part of the Civil Operations Rural Development Support (CORDS) program, contingency operations have repeatedly had both a military and the non-military component. The existing procedures governing campaign planning highlight the need for coordination with the other departments and agencies of the USG during deliberate planning and also caution that the President will be considering all options to address a contingency during crisis action planning and that the military option may be the least desirable.<sup>v</sup> However, this imperative to work with the other USG agencies has not translated into effective interagency coordination. Poor coordination has continued to impact military operations during the GWOT and has led to the creation of various forms of Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACGs) within each of the Regional Combatant Commands.<sup>vi</sup> The U. S. Central Command (CENTCOM) JIACG is the most refined of all the combatant commands, primarily due to its participation in operations in Afghanistan where it includes representatives from the Federal Bureau of Investigations, Central Intelligence Agency, Customs Service, National Security Agency, and the Departments of State, Justice, and Treasury.<sup>vii</sup> All of the members of the CENTCOM JIACG coordinated USG efforts

in the field and sought to coordinate policy guidance from their respective headquarters back in Washington, DC. The JIACG had some success in synchronizing the often disparate policy goals in their area of operations, but it was not able to fundamentally affect policy disconnects that originated in Washington. Moreover, the efforts of the JIACG focused on execution of a given task, not the development of plans for the area of operations. Conceptually, the JIACG is a good first step, but it fails to address existing gaps in planning between the various USG organizations and it maintains the paradigm of a military-centric process for operations. The USG must synchronize our national policy goals within both the planning and execution of operations. Attempts to correct problems “on the ground” will not be enough to overcome poor planning at the outset and will invariably lead to poor execution during a crisis.

Many senior leaders within the USG have suggested that the interagency reform needed for the planning and execution of contingency operations is a “Goldwater-Nichols Act” for the interagency. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 mandated sweeping reforms within the DoD and significantly increased the powers of the combatant commanders.<sup>viii</sup> It is credited with making the DoD a much more effective fighting force and greatly reducing the friction during operations caused by Service rivalry and parochialism. The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) is examining this recommendation in an ongoing study titled “Beyond Goldwater-Nichols” and has made numerous recommendations in the first two reports issued. Among these recommendations are the establishment of planning cells within key civilian agencies, creation of an interagency training and education center, and establishment of an office for stability operations.<sup>ix</sup> While the study is not yet complete, the USG has already acted upon some of the recommendations from

earlier reports, most notably the creation of the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) within the Department of State.

S/CRS' mission is to lead, coordinate, and institutionalize the civilian capacity of the USG to prepare for post-conflict situations and to help stabilize societies to allow them to transition from conflict to peace, democracy, and a market economy.<sup>x</sup> By serving as a coordinating agent for all civilian USG activities during post-conflict operations, S/CRS will harmonize all of various civilian policy priorities with the operational needs of the DoD. While it is promising that the USG is trying new ideas in its efforts to reform, the fact that S/CRS is within the Department of State vice a more central authority such as the National Security Council weakens its authority over the other agencies of the Executive Branch. All of the departments and agencies can still choose to ignore the direction of S/CRS as long as they can maintain independent control of personnel and funding for their respective organizations. Additionally, S/CRS's lack of dedicated funding within the Department of State's budget places it at the mercy of the Secretary of State to approve staffing and funding priorities.<sup>xi</sup> Although S/CRS does seek to address the issue of integrated planning with the DoD, as long as the combatant commanders' staffs drive the campaign planning process, the plans produced will continue to lack the detail needed to support non-military activities that are essential to the achievement of the overall campaign goals.

### **The National Campaign Planning Staff**

In spite of its own doctrine and directives, the DoD has repeatedly failed to integrate all of the elements of national power into its campaign plans. To truly reform the existing campaign planning process, overall responsibility for the development of integrated campaign plans should

be relocated outside the DoD to the National Security Council (NSC). According to the National Security Act of 1947, the NSC will “advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies related to national security so as to enable the military services and other departments and agencies of the government to cooperate more effectively in matters of national security.”<sup>xii</sup> While the role of the NSC has evolved since its creation in 1947, it has always worked directly for the President and has consistently been the organization tasked to articulate the policy goals to the other USG agencies.

In recent years, the NSC has been the organization tasked to coordinate the interagency policy process through its various policy coordination committees in order to develop policy options for the President and coordinate the activities of various agencies during crises.<sup>xiii</sup> Unfortunately, the process used by the DoD to develop deliberate plans receives no input from the NSC and has little coordination with the other USG departments and agencies. As has been previously noted, these deliberate plans are inevitably focused on military capabilities in their choice of solutions to the contingency at hand; and therefore, limit the options available to the President during a crisis. The assignment of the planning process to the NSC vice the SECDEF




Figure 1 - Current National Security Council structure

and the CJCS will change the focus of campaign planning from military operations that leverage all of the elements of national power simply by the participation of the other USG departments and agencies. It will also better represent the overarching policy goals of the United States, not exclusively the National Security and National Defense Strategies.

This change would mean little unless the NSC has the responsibility and associated authorities to produce the deliberate plans that are required. The existing structure of the NSC with its Principal, Deputies, and Policy Coordination Committees does not have sufficient manpower or resources to accomplish this task. The total staff of the NSC consists of approximately 225 personnel with the majority detailed from other departments within the Executive Branch. Additionally, the de facto head of the NSC, the National Security Advisor, is not a statutory member of the NSC and is simply the personal advisor to the President on national security matters.<sup>xiv</sup> In order to create the multi-faceted deliberate plans needed to quickly respond to contingencies of all types throughout the world, the National Security Advisor will have to be elevated to the level of a department secretary to allow a peer relationship with the other Cabinet secretaries when dealing with planning issues. The NSC will also require the creation of a dedicated planning staff (hereafter referred to as the National Campaign Planning Staff) to fulfill this new responsibility of translating the national policy goals and objectives into capabilities-based campaign plans.

The National Campaign Planning Staff (NCPS) would replace the existing geographic directorates of the NSC and consist of groups that mirror the existing combatant command structure with each group reporting to the Deputy National Security Advisor for Planning (a new position within the NSC structure) for the direction of the day to day planning effort. These groups would consist of representatives from all of the cabinet level departments as well as

selected agencies within the executive branch with the specific number of representatives determined by each respective department.<sup>xv</sup> At a minimum, departments would be required to assign one representative to each regional/functional group. Each group would also have a director and deputy director hired directly by the NSC to coordinate the planning activities of the group and who reports to the Deputy National Security Advisor for Planning. While the NCPS members work within their respective groups under the authority of a director and the Assistant Deputy National Security Advisor for Planning, they will remain on the rolls of their parent organizations using a detail system much as the NSC does today.




Figure 2 Š Proposed National Campaign Planning Staff structure

The NCPS would be a distinct part of the NSC with specific responsibilities and its own facilities somewhere within the greater Washington, DC area. Basing the NCPS near Washington, DC will leverage the resources available within the other departments and agencies of the USG and facilitate coordination with all other parts of the Executive Branch. The overall staffing requirement for the NCPS will be determined by an analysis of mission requirements and comparison to existing planning staffs within the DoD and other departments. However, it is expected that a staff of at least 150 personnel of sufficient experience and seniority (O-4/GS-12 through O-7/SES) would be required to prepare campaign plans with sufficient detail to support the requirements of the combatant commanders. Assigning personnel to the NCPS for a period of 36 months will ensure that the necessary planning skills are developed and maintained within the staff. These personnel will not be permitted to serve more than two tours (72 months) on the staff to ensure that they remain competitive for advancement within their parent organizations and that all representatives to the NCPS maintain a current understanding of their respective organization's policy requirements. The NCPS would work regularly with senior officials and commanders in Washington, DC and in the field and would be the first level of coordination between USG departments and agencies on policy matters as they relate to national policy issues.

Initially, it may seem strange to include representatives for departments such as Education or Veterans Affairs in this planning staff, but the point of creating this new staff is to ensure that the USG harnesses all of the expertise within its elements for planning contingency operations. The following examples illustrate possible participation by these agencies. In a given effort overseas, the Department of Education could be involved with the development of curriculum within a fragile state to prevent influence by organizations seeking to foster unrest and instability. They could also be involved with the development of sister-school relationships

with institutions in an allied nation we are trying to support in an unstable region. The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) could work with the DoD to forecast numbers of wounded personnel during a given operation in order to develop plans for their return to the United States and their needs as they transition to civilian life. The VA could also help to identify needs for veterans within a developing nation as they work through the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process.

All of the members of the NCPS will have specific technical knowledge and skills to bring to the planning process and the wide array of backgrounds and skills will have a significant impact on the number of ways to approach a given problem. They will also serve as easily identifiable points of contact for coordination with similar organizations within other governments, international organizations, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). For example, instead of a medical NGO trying to coordinate efforts with DoD planners, they can coordinate with the U. S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Department of Health and Human Services representatives who have more experience and understanding of the issues. If required, the NCPS will have the ability to request additional subject matter experts from all parts of the Executive Branch to support the development of specific campaign plans.

Once established, the NCPS's regional groups will develop capabilities-based plans for contingencies within their respective areas of responsibility. These plans will replace the existing deliberate plans (operations plans, concept plans, and functional plans) maintained by the combatant commanders and will serve as the foundation for crisis action planning as it currently exists within the DoD's Joint Operations Planning and Execution System. Plans developed will not be limited to military operations and will include topics ranging from response to a global pandemic to collapse of financial markets. Since the ultimate end-user of a

campaign plan for military operations is a combatant commander or a subordinate joint task force commander, the NCPS will include liaison officers from all of the combatant commands and any standing joint task forces. However, this is not to say that all campaign plans will have a combatant commander in the lead or a significant military component. For instance, plans developed to respond to health issues could have a task force lead from the Department of Health and Human Services or USAID and consist of mostly civilian technical experts. However, all task forces will have liaison representatives from every organization represented on the NCPS in order to address technical issues as they relate to the original plan and to maintain situational awareness for the organizations not directly involved in the task.

Plan development by the NCPS will begin with a thorough review of existing deliberate plans in the context of the current policies of all of the departments of the USG. As a given plan is completed, the members of the NCPS will provide the changes required to execute the plan in the context of overall USG policy goals, not just the military objectives of the plan. Once this review of existing deliberate plans is completed, to include staffing of the plan to the appropriate combatant commands and USG civilian departments for concurrence, it will be considered ready for implementation and be placed “on the shelf” for use during contingency operations. Once the review of all existing campaign plans is completed, the NCPS will then begin to develop other deliberate plans to address issues not previously addressed by the DoD planning process. These new plans will focus on those operations that can prevent conflict or mitigate the effects of natural or man-made disasters throughout the world. If events require the execution of a campaign plan, the NCPS will forward the plan to the appropriate agency (combatant commanders in the case of a DoD-lead operation) for further refinement and execution as described by the existing DoD crisis action planning process. Initially, the NCPS will use the

same two year review cycle that currently exists within the DoD for deliberate plans, but this may change as the transition to centrally managed plans is completed. In all of the campaign plans, the NCPS will use all of the resources available within the USG to resolve conflict and to maintain peaceful political dialogue and free commerce among the nations of the world.

The reengineering of the NSC to include the NCPS is a drastic change, but one that is urgently needed. This reassignment of responsibility for the development of campaign plans does not mean that combatant commanders will cease all planning efforts. Combatant commanders, by virtue of their location in a given region and their insight into the complex cultural and political dynamics of a region, will continue to be an integral part of the process through their representatives at the NCPS and through daily operations in their respective AORs. The value that the NCPS will bring is that instead of a blank page, the combatant commander will receive a campaign plan that has already been synchronized across all of the functions within the Executive Branch, to include his concerns as voiced through his representative(s) on the staff. This will allow him to focus his limited time and resources on transitioning the plan to execution without wondering if the plan supports all of the national objectives. While it is true that a regional combatant commander's staff is closer to a political situation in a given nation in its AOR than a staff in Washington, DC, it is also true that the regional combatant commander's staff will invariably have a military view of a given situation no matter how impartial it attempts to be. The NCPS will, simply through its makeup, have a more holistic view of a given problem and will generate campaign plans that more accurately represent all of the elements of national power than plans created by the regional combatant commander's staff.

Another concern with the NCPS may be the unwillingness to centralize authority into a single organization within the Executive Branch for contingency planning without oversight by

Congress. The fear of a centralized staff that could develop too much power over strategy as that once held by the German General Staff still influences Congress' view of the military, and therefore, the existing campaign planning process.<sup>xvi</sup> The same Congressional budgetary and legislative oversight that currently exists for the DoD and the combatant commanders will continue for this planning staff and should mitigate this concern. The NCPS will have the authority to generate contingency plans to guide the actions of all of the agencies within the Executive Branch during a crisis, but will have no authority to direct action by any part of the USG and will not have any ability to direct procurement of systems. The execution of any campaign plan by the DoD or any other USG agency will continue to be only at the direction of the President as permitted by current law. Finally, this proposal of the NCPS is not without precedent. During World War II, the War Department developed the Joint War Plans Committee (JWPC) to outline joint plans for future operations to include the synchronization of the views of the Army, Navy and Air staffs. The JWPC sent these plans to the theater commanders to serve as a starting point for subsequent planning of operations in their AORs.<sup>xvii</sup> While this staff did not direct the actual conduct of the operations, it did bind the scope of operations through the allocation of resources and helped to shape outcomes through its provision of plans for the theater commander in a time-constrained environment. The NCPS would fulfill a similar need for the combatant commanders while expanding the view of the plans to incorporate all of the parts of the USG.

### **From Concept to Reality**

In order to make the NCPS a reality, several actions need to occur within the Legislative and Executive Branches. Congress must introduce legislation to transfer responsibility for

campaign planning from the SECDEF and CJCS, as it now rests as directed in Title 10 of U.S. Code, to the National Security Advisor and the NSC.<sup>xviii</sup> This would undoubtedly lead to another legislative change, the elevation of the positions of National Security Advisor and Deputy National Security Advisor for Planning to ones that require the advice and consent of the Senate. Currently, the National Security Advisor and his staff are only advisors to the President, and therefore, the Senate has no authority over their selection. With the significant increase in authority that the responsibility for campaign planning would bring, the Congress will want more control over who fills these positions in order to provide additional oversight. Additionally, Congress will need to apportion a significant budget to the NSC for the operation of the NCPS. Although most NCPS personnel will still be paid by their sourcing departments and agencies, the NCPS will need facilities, funding for travel, and other support that will have substantial cost. Because of the constrained budgetary environment that will exist for the foreseeable future, the budget for the NCPS will need to be created from comparable reductions within the DoD.

Once these legislative tasks are completed, the President would then issue a National Presidential Security Directive assigning the National Security Advisor as the executive agent for national security planning and the NSC as the lead organization for the development of campaign plans. This would allow the National Security Advisor to make the previously recommended changes to the NSC's structure and appoint the Deputy National Security Advisor for Planning, who would then form the NCPS and begin to assign personnel to its regional planning staffs. As previously described, this new NCPS would require approximately 150 personnel organized into six planning groups. Concurrent with the staffing of the NCPS, the DoD would conduct a thorough review of existing doctrine and procedure regarding the development of campaign plans to make the changes necessary to comply with the Title 10 changes and the newly issued

NSDD. Additionally, the SECDEF would direct the combatant commanders to develop teams to transition their respective plans to the NCPS once it is operational. The NCPS would then begin the process of reviewing the existing deliberate plans maintained by the DoD to determine which plans can be retained with limited revision and which contingencies would require completely new plans. The transition from the existing DoD-driven planning process to one controlled by the NCPS is expected to take at least five years once funded, so the earliest it could be completed is budget year 2012.

Reform of the campaign planning system is vital to the successful implementation of United States foreign policy and our effective use of all of the tools within the USG to defeat the enemies of the United States. Although adequate for conventional military operations, the existing campaign planning system does not support warfighting writ large because of its failure to incorporate all of the elements of national power and to adequately represent all of the agencies of the USG. Without reform, the United States will continue to ask its military to address all of the problems encountered during conflict with other nations without the benefit of the participation of the other USG agencies. As displayed by the competing requirements of Operation Iraqi Freedom and the greater GWOT, the DoD cannot effectively address all of the aspects of future warfare. If it is to be successful, the USG must find a way to use all of the resources available within the Government (both military and civilian) and must plan for political, economic, and social solutions to crisis and well as combat operations. Through the creation of the NCPS, the United States will develop plans for contingency operations that integrate all of the strengths of the USG and accurately reflect the policy goals and requirements of all the agencies of the USG. This will not only lead to more options for the President during a crisis, it will also create a more holistic view of foreign policy and better utilize all of the

strengths of the USG. While warfare will continue to evolve, it is never a purely military activity, and the reforms proposed to the planning process will ensure that the United States can successfully conduct all levels of warfare in pursuit of its national policy objectives with the nations of the world.

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<sup>i</sup> United States Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Publication 1-02 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1998). [http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new\\_pubs](http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs)

<sup>ii</sup> United States Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Publication 5-00.1, Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995), III-3.

<sup>iii</sup> *Ibid*, III-2.

<sup>iv</sup> The National Security Strategy of the United States of America. September 2002. preface.

<sup>v</sup> JP 5-00.1, IV-2.

<sup>vi</sup> Ambassador (Ret.) Edward Marks. “Letter to the Editor.” *Joint Forces Quarterly* 39 (4<sup>th</sup> quarter 2005), 8.

<sup>vii</sup> Col. Matthew F. Bogdanos, USMCR “Joint Interagency Cooperation: The First Step.” *Joint Forces Quarterly* 37 (April 2005), 2.

<sup>viii</sup> Alan G. Whittaker, Ph.D, Smith, Frederick C., and McKune, Elizabeth Amb., “The National Security Policy Process: The National Security Council and Interagency System” Annual Update August 2005, 36.

<sup>ix</sup> Clark A. Murdock. *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era. Phase 1 Report.* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2004), 10.

<sup>x</sup> Department of State website <http://www.state.gov/s/crs/c12936.htm>

<sup>xi</sup> Colonel John C. Buss, USA. “The State Department Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization and Its Interaction with the Department of Defense.” U.S. Army War College Issue Paper. (Center for Strategic Leadership, U.S. Army War College, July 2005), 2.

<sup>xii</sup> Whittaker, Smith, and McKune, “The National Security Policy Process”, 15.

<sup>xiii</sup> *Ibid*, 21.

<sup>xiv</sup> *Ibid*, 10.

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<sup>xv</sup> The members of the National Campaign Planning Staff will include representatives from the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Defense (including representatives from each Service as well as the Joint Staff and the Combatant Commands), Education, Energy, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, Housing and Urban Development, Interior, Justice (including representatives from the Drug Enforcement Agency and Federal Bureau of Investigations), Labor, State (including representatives from the U.S. Agency for International Development), Transportation, Treasury, Veterans Affairs, and representatives from the National Intelligence Community.

<sup>xvi</sup> Whittaker, Smith, and McKune, “The National Security Policy Process”, 37.

<sup>xvii</sup> Ray Cline. *Washington Command Post*. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1950.

<sup>xviii</sup> U. S. Code, Title 10, Section 153.

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